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DAUBERT AND THE USE OF EXPERTS IN VIRGINIA CAPITAL CASES
BY: J. CONRAD GARCIA
I. Daubert and Virginia Law
In Daubert v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, the plaintiffs sued a
drug manufacturing company contending that one ofits drugs, Bendectin,
caused birth defects. The manufacturer moved for summary judgment in
the district court, arguing that Bendectin does not cause birth defects in
humans and that the plaintiffs would be unable to come forward with any
admissible evidence to the contrary. The district court granted the
manufacturer's motion for summary judgment, holding that scientific
evidence is admissible only if the principle upon which it is based is
"sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to which
it belongs. ' 2 The plaintiff's evidence did not meet this standard. The
"general acceptance" test which the district court implemented was
established in Frye v. United States.3 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision and its use of the Frye test.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whetherFrye's "general acceptance" test was superseded by the Federal
Rules of Evidence for allowing expert scientific testimony in federal
courts. The Court reversed the lower courts' holdings, ruling that the
Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
Daubert dealt specifically with experts offering "scientific knowl-
edge" under rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
The Court concluded that "[n]othing in the text of this Rule
establishes 'general acceptance' as an absolute prerequisite to admissi-
bility." 4 The drafting history does not mention the rigid "general accep-
tance" test and would be at odds with the "liberal thrust" of the Federal
Rules and their "general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
'opinion' testimony."5 The Court, therefore, held that Frye was super-
seded based on the content of the congressionally-enacted Federal Rules
of Evidence.
The Court did conclude, however, that even though the Frye test
had been displaced, limits would still exist on the admissibility of
1 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
2 Id. at 2792.
3 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
5 Id. at 2794, quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S.
153, 169 (1988) (citing Rules 701 to 705).




10 Id. at 2796.




scientific evidence. A trial court judge must "ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable."6 The court determined that the adjective "scientific" in Rule
702 "implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science.
Similarly, the word 'knowledge' connotes more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation." 7 The Court also noted that Rule 702 requires
that scientific evidence or testimony be relevant, in that it assists the trier
of fact in understanding the evidence or to determining a fact in issue.
8
The Court listed four "general observations" for federal judges to
inquire about when determining whether scientific evidence should be
allowed in the courtroom. These four inquires are not dispositive and
many additional factors will bear on the inquiry. Thus these inquires are
not a definitive checklist or test.9
The four inquires in determining under Rule 702 whether a theory
or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact are as
follows: (1) ". . .[W]hether it can be (and has been) tested;" 10 (2)
" [W]hether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication." 11 "The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer-
reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consid-
eration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or
methodology on which an opinion is premised[;] ' 12 (3) The potential
rate of error in a particular scientific technique; 13 and (4) Whether the
scientific knowledge has been generally accepted. 14 The Court thus
retained Frye's "general acceptance" standard as one of its inquiries. The
Court noted that widespread acceptance is an important factor, and a
technique with only minimal support should be viewed with skepticism
when determining the admissibility of evidence. 15 The Court envisioned
Federal Rule 702 to be a flexible one.
16
The Court noted that throughout a proceeding, a judge must keep
other applicable rules in mind when determining if expert scientific
testimony should be allowed in, 17 and that the power to admit scientific
evidence is at the discretion of the trial judge. Also, the Court reempha-
sized "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence,
and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."
18
II. Daubert's Application In Virginia
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was adopted by Virginia and codi-
fied under Virginia Code section 8.01-401.3(A). 19 The problem with this
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. Fed. R. Evid. 703 (allowing expert opinion based on other-
wise inadmissible hearsay only if such evidence is of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field), 706 (allowing the court at
its discretion to select an expert), and 403 (permitting the exclusion of
relevant evidence if its value unfairly prejudices the jury).
18 Id. at 2798.
19 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-401.3(A) states: "In a civil proceeding,
if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
(emphasis added).
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statute is that it speaks of "a civil proceeding." The Supreme Court of
Virginia held that a similar statute, Virginia Code section 8.01-401.120,
which mirrored Federal Rule of Evidence 703 and 705, was limited to
civil cases despite the Commonwealth's argument that the statute should
be expanded to criminal cases:
The Commonwealth .... , urges us to adopt, in substance, the
view of the Federal Rules of Evidence .... We are unwilling
to accept this invitation. The General Assembly, in 1982,
enacted Code § 8.01-401.1 which essentially adopts the fore-
going provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. That
statute's application is expressly limited to "any civil action."
We regard this limitation as a clear expression of legislative
intent to retain the historic restrictions upon expert testimony
in criminal cases in Virginia.
2 1
Therefore, the enactment of Code section 8.01-401.3 should affect
only civil cases. The test for determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence is determined by the common law of Virginia.
For criminal cases, the Supreme Court of Virginia has declined to
adopt the "general acceptance" test developed in Frye,2 2 instead holding
that "relevant scientific evidence is admissible if the expert is qualified
to give testimony and the science upon which he testifies is reliable.
' 23
Thus,
the court must make a threshold finding of fact with respect to
the reliability of the scientific method offered, unless it is of a
kind so familiar and accepted as to require no foundation to
establish the fundamental reliability of the system, such as
fingerprint analysis, [citation omitted]; or unless it is so unre-
liable that the considerations requiring its exclusion have
ripened into rules of law, such as "lie-detector" tests, [citation
omitted]; or unless its admission is regulated by statute, such
as blood-alcohol test results, Code § § 18.2-268(0), -268(Y)." 24
A trial court's finding will not be disturbed on appeal if its decision
is supported by credible evidence. If the scientific reliability is disputed,
and if the court finds there to be a sufficient foundation to warrant
admission of evidence, the court may, in its discretion, admit the
evidence with instructions to the jury.25 "Wide discretion must be vested
in the trial court to determine, when unfamiliar scientific evidence is
20 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-401.1 states: "In any civil action any
expert witness may give testimony and render an opinion or draw
inferences from facts, circumstances or data made known to or perceived
by such witness at or before the hearing or trial during which he is called
upon to testify. The facts, circumstances or data relied upon by such
witness in forming an opinion or drawing inferences .... need not be
admissible in evidence.
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his
reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data,
unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be
required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-
examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination,
statements contained in published treatises, periodicals or pamphlets on
a subject of history, medicine or other science or art, established as a
reliable authority by testimony or by stipulation shall not be excluded as
hearsay. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence buy may
not be received as exhibits. If the statements are to be introduced through
an expert witness upon direct examination, copies of the statements shall
be provided to opposing parties thirty days prior to trial unless otherwise
offered, whether the evidence is so inherently unreliable that a lay jury
must be shielded from it, or whether it is of such character that the jury
may safely be left to determine credibility .... 
26
As of this date there has only been one Virginia case discussing
Daubert, Cotton v. Commonwealth27. In Cotton, the defendant was
convicted of robbery based on fingernail comparison evidence. The
majority concluded that the trial court had used its sound discretion in
admitting the fingernail comparison based upon credible evidence.
28
The Commonwealth's expert presented to the trial court her: extensive
curriculum vitae, setting forth academic and professional qualifications,
work experience, and professional associations concerning fingernail
analysis.29 The majority concluded thatthe Commonwealth's experthad
withstood cross-examination and found no error in the trial court's
acceptance of the fingernail comparison as a valid scientific means of
personal identification and, therefore in allowing the expert to describe
the comparison of the fingernail fragment found at the scene with the
defendant's fingernail.
30
Judge Benton, concurring and dissenting in part, believed that the
expert's testimony should not have been allowed and, would have
reversed the conviction. Judge Benton critically analyzed the
Commonwealth's expert qualifications and tests that were run on the
fingernail and concluded that the results were not reliable.3 1 Judge
Benton incorporated into his analysis Daubert and its four inquiries. He
concluded that
[a]lthough consideration of these factors is not expressly
required by any ruling from the Supreme Court of Virginia,
these factors manifest a concern not limited to federal jurispru-
dence, that the principles and methodology which underlie a
proffered technique be based upon 'a reliable scientific tech-
nique,' the test espoused by Spencer. Furthermore, these
factors are relevant in Virginia because our Supreme Court
requires an inquiry into the question of reliability.
32
A rehearing en banc was granted, in Cotton v. Commonwealth.
33
The panel decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed in part and
reversed in part on other grounds. Judge Benton referred to his initial
dissenting opinion, but no further discussion of Daubert took place.
Thus, Daubert has yet to be expressly adopted or rejected in the Virginia
Courts, but Virginia's common law test would appear to be reconcilable
with Daubert's analysis along the lines argued by Judge Benton.
ordered by the court." (emphasis added),
21 Simpson v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 557,566,318 S.E.2d 386,
391 (1984).
22 O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672,364 S.E.2d 491 (1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).
23 Farley v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 495,498,458 S.E.2d 310,
312 (1995) (citing O'Dell, 234 Va. at 695-96, 364 S.E.2d at 504-05).
24 Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78,97,393 S.E.2d 609,621
(1990).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 240 Va. at 98, 393 S.E.2d at 621.
27 19 Va. App. 306,451 S.E.2d 673 (rev'd and remanded on other
grounds) (1994) (reh'g granted (March 9, 1995)).
28 Cotton, 19 Va. App. at 311,451 S.E.2d at 676.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 316-319, 451 S.E.2d at 678-681.
32 Id. at 321-322, 451 S.E.2d at 681.
33 20 Va. App. 596,459 S.E.2d 527 (1995).
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This leaves defense counsel with the opportunity to argue that the
Daubert factors are to be used by the Virginia Courts. Virginia case law
and Daubert both place great emphasis on the relevance and reliability
of expert testimony. Therefore, defense counsel should argue that
Daubert is persuasive authority in Virginia and that logic calls for its
adoption.
M. How Daubert Can Help in Capital Cases
Expert testimony is important in many capital cases, including
testimony dealing with ballistics, future dangerousness, and blood splat-
ters. Aprosecutorhas the burden of establishing thatthe Commonwealth's
scientific evidence is admissible. Any objections to its admissibility
must be carefully framed so they can be properly preserved for appeal.
34
Remember as defense counsel that after the four inquiries of Daubert,
there still is the balancing test under Rule 403 of whether the value of the
evidence substantially outweighs the unfair prejudice arising from the
admission of such testimony. 35 Therefore, any testimony pursuant to
Daubert requires a pretrial hearing.36 If a pretrial hearing is not granted,
a motion to exclude the expert should be drafted. An advantage to these
types of pre-trial motions is that they exclude the prejudicial material
before a jury can hear it.
This approach is in keeping with the Virginia Supreme Court's
view that "[a] separate hearing is generally advisable to avoid a possible
mistrial in the event a trial court concludes the tests are not sufficiently
reliable to be introduced in evidence."37 An opponent of expert testi-
mony "need not wait until after the evidence has been admitted to assert
a challenge. He may raise it prior to trial by motion to exclude the
evidence or at trial by examining the expert, out of the presence of the jury
prior to a ruling on the admissibility of the [evidence]." '38 Under the
Rules of the Court, the defendant has a right to discover written scientific
reports. 39 These provisions in Virginia law should, at the very least,
provide defense counsel with pertinent information regarding the
Commonwealth's case.
Because expert testimony is closely related to the admissibility of
scientific evidence, the tests for the admissibility of expert testimony
must be researched by defense counsel as well. Generally the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony has been governed by whatever "the subject
matter of the inquiry was not within the range of common experience."
40
Moreover, Virginia's rule for the breadth of the expert's testimony is
34 Barbara Bergman, et. al., Samurai Lawyer: Aggressive Use of
Underutilized Evidence Rules, supplement p. 5, April 28, 1995, (The
Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
35 Id.
36 Id. at7, (citingRobinson v.MissouriPacificR. Co., 16 F.3d 1083
(10th Cir. 1994) (district court should make an early pretrial evaluation
of issues of admissibility involving scientific expert opinions); In reJoint
Eastern and Southern DistrictsAsbestos Litigation, 151 F.R.D. 540,545
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (Daubert may require pretrial hearings under Rule 104
of the Federal Rules of Evidence to determine whether, and under what
conditions, expert testimony is admissible.))
37 O'Dell, 234 Va. at 695, 364 S.E.2d at 504.
38 2 Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia, § 17-14
(4th ed. 1993) (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Evans v. Harrison, 5 Va.
App. 8, 13, 360 S.E.2d 212, 214 (1987)).
39 1 Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia, § 14-12
(4th ed. 1993). (citing Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 384
S.E.2d 785 (1989)), citing Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:1 1(a)(1)-(2).
40 2 Friend at § 17-14(a).
41 Va. CodeAnn. § 8.01-401.1 is themirrorimage of FederalRules
of Evidence 703 and 705 except that the statutory language limits it to
more narrow for criminal cases than that for federal rule 703 or for civil
proceedings in Virginia under Virginia Code section 8.01-401.1.41 In
criminal cases, an expert
may give an opinion based upon his own knowledge of facts
disclosed in his testimony or he may give an opinion based
upon facts in evidence assumed in a hypothetical question..
.Generally, an expert witness in Virginia has not been permit-
ted to base his opinion on facts not in evidence.42
Any time the Commonwealth intends to use an expert, defense
counsel should make a motion in limine for all underlying data upon
which the government expert relied, such as manuals, guidelines, re-
ports, rules, regulations, as soon as defense has been placed on notice that
an expert will testify.43 If such a motion is denied and the Common-
wealth places an expert on the stand, defense counsel should subject the
expert to rigorous cross examination, and, in doing so inquire, as to the
underlying facts or data that help form the expert's opinion.
Many times a prosecutor will attempt to use law enforcement
officers as de facto experts in certain fields. This type of testimony is very
prejudicial to the defendant because police officers are "not experts but
advocates and their testimony is unfairly prejudicial." 44 To try to
safeguard the client's right to a fair trial, request that any police officer
who is going to testify as an expert not be allowed to testify also as a fact
witness,45 and request that the prosecutor not refer to the police officer
as an expert.46 If the Commonwealth failed to give notice of an officer
as an expert, object and use this to bolster your argument that the officer
really is not an "expert" but rather just a lay witness since even the
prosecutor seems to view the officer that way. And, if the witness is not
an expert, the witness's opinion testimony is inadmissible. 47 In Virginia
"[o]pinion evidence is only admissible where it would be helpful to the
jury. If thejurors are as capable of forming theirown opinions upon given
data as the witness whose opinion is offered in evidence, then the opinion
is not admissible. ' 48 Therefore, defense counsel should challenge such
testimony as inadmissible opinion testimony.
Defense counsel, of course, should also be planning how to admit
their experts' testimony. An anticipatory motion should be drafted49
with the goal of persuading the court to admit defense's testimony
because it is
"civil actions." The Virginia Supreme Court rejected the argument that
§ 8.01-401.1 should be interpreted to include criminal cases. O'Dell v.
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672,364 S.E.2d 491, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871
(1988).
42 1 Friend at § 17-18 (citing Simpson v. Commonwealth, 227 Va.
557, 318 S.E.2d 386 (1984), citing Wheelwright v. Matthew, 210 Va.
382,171S.E. 2d 180(1969). For furtherdiscussion concerning thebasis
for expert testimony see 2 Friend, § 17-18.
43 Bergman, supra note 32, at 11.
44 Id. at 10.
45 Id. (citing Beach v. United States, 466 A.2d 862 (D.C. 1983)).
46 Id. (citing United States v. Thomas, 797 F. Supp. 19,24 (D.D.C.
1992)).
47 Id. at fn. 12.
48 Lakeside Inn Corp. v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 696, 701, 114
S.E. 769, 771 (1922). See 2 Friend, § 17 et seq. for further explanation.
49 Bergman, supra note 32, at 15 (citing Charles W. Daniels'
winning motions with the author's alterations.)
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scientific testimony, grounded in the methods and procedures
of science.... [which] will assist the trier of fact to understand
or determine facts and issues concerning defendant's intent
and knowledge. The testimony is based on scientific knowl-
edge, relating to hypotheses that can be and have been tested,
techniques that have been subjected to peer review and publi-
cation, subject to reasonably acceptable potential rates of
error, subject to standards controlling the techniques opera-
tion, and sufficiently accepted within the relevant scientific.
. . community.50
50 Bergman, supra note 32, at 16.
51 Id.
The motion should also stress that the evidence is necessary to
provide the defendant a fair trial guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and
as part of the "right to produce witnesses guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment... 51 The motion must be supported by memoranda and
other points of authority to persuade the court to allow such testimony.
Even though the Virginia courts have not formally adopted Daubert,
such a motion places great importance on the relevance and reliability of
scientific evidence, which is the backbone of Virginia's evidence rules
concerning scientific expert testimony.
DNA EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA
. BY: STEVEN M. JOHNSON
Although the admissability and reliability of DNA evidence made
big headlines during O.J. Simpson's trial just last year, problems sur-
rounding DNA testing were around well before the "trial of the century."
The Capital Defense Digest published an article in 1992 on DNA
evidence, 1 but advances in technology, literature, case law, and defense
tactics in the intervening years warrant another look at DNA evidence.
I. Technological Advances In DNA Analysis 2
The Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) form of DNA testing was
first developed by Kary Mullis in 1984.3 This simple technique revolu-
tionized the study of DNA to such an extent that Ms. Mullis was awarded
the Nobel prize in 1994.4 PCR is generally used when the sample
containing DNA is degraded or to small to perform the more accurate
RFLP test.
5
Imagine two Leggos, one red and one white, stuck together. Those
Leggos are snapped apart and a new white Leggo attaches to the old red
Leggo and anew red Leggo attaches to the old white Leggo. This process
repeats over and over, creating millions of paired Leggos. This is
essentially how the PCR process is used to replicate DNA.
The most common form of PCR is the DQA1 test. This test is
performed by mixing the sample (or template DNA) with the Taq DNA
Polymerase enzyme, the four DNA building blocks, 6 and DNA probes
or primer. This mixture is heated to separate the template DNA into
single strands. As the mixture cools, the primers bind to both strands of
the DQA1 gene. The Taq DNA Polymerase then recognizes the bond of
I Christopher J. Lonsbury, The Current State of DNA Evidence,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2 p. 11 (1992). Mr. Lonsbury's
article focuses on RFLP DNA testing mechanics, probability calcula-
tions, case law through early 1992 and some advice for defense counsel.
2 This section is a simplified explanation of the PCR test. See,
Kamrin T. MacKnight, The Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR): The
Second Generation of DNA Analysis Methods Takes the Stand, 9 Santa
Clara Computer & High-Tech. LJ. 287 (1993), and Howard Coleman &
Eric Swenson, DNA in the Courtroom (1994).
3 MacKnight, supra note 2, at 300-01.
4 Coleman & Swenson supra note 2, at 53.
primer and template as a place to catalyze the making of new DNA,
identical to the old DNA.7 The process is repeated thirty times, creating
literally millions of DQA1 genes.8 The DNA is again separated into two
strands, allowing probes to bind with specific sequences present in the
newly created (amplified) DNA.9 Nylon is then pressed against the
sample and half the sample (a "dot") attaches to the nylon in a distinct
pattern. This pattern can then be compared to the known samples for
identification. 10
Kamrin MacKnight identifies four concerns with PCR testing: "(1)
'Allelic drop-out'; (2) the sensitivity of the test and the potential for
contamination; (3) the small number of laboratories conducting the test;
and (4) interpretation problems."11
"Allelic drop-out" describes a situation where the test procedure
preferentially amplifies one of two alleles (various types of each gene)
to such an extent that it would appear a heterozygous individual (carrying
both a dominant and recessive gene) is homozygous (carrying either both
dominant or both recessive genes). 12 Apparently this problem only
occurs when the testing temperature drops significantly below 94*
Celsius.
13
Because PCR is such a sensitive test, another possible problem is
that contaminating DNA might be present in the sample which would
disguise the sample DNA. 14 This problem is of particular concern in
criminal cases where a crime scene is not as sterile as a laboratory.
Although one possible source of contamination is non-human DNA, the
probes in the test system do not recognize, much less amplify non-
primate DNA (leaving open the unlikely scenario of contamination by
Id.
Adenine, guanine, thymine and cytosine.
Coleman & Swenson, supra note 2, at 53.
Id.
MacKnight, supra note 2, at 306.
Id. at 306-307.
Id. at 314.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 316.
